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Encouraging Entrepreneurship: Microfinance, Knowledge Support, and the Costs
of Operating in Institutional Voids
By:
Subrata Chakrabarty and A. Erin Bass

Abstract
This study focuses on the supplemented strategies of microfinance institutions (MFIs), in which the MFI
offers nonfinancial services, such as entrepreneurship related knowledge, in addition to financial
services to impoverished borrowers at the bottom of the pyramid (BoP). We examine two contextual
factors–foreign direct investment (FDI) and loan defaults–to better understand the relationship between
providing knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship and costs of operating at the BoP for MFIs.
In contexts where FDI is low and loan defaults are high, providing knowledge support to encourage
entrepreneurship aggravates the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. However, in contexts where FDI is
high and loan defaults are low, providing knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship among
impoverished borrowers does not aggravate the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. Hence, in emerging
markets where governments welcome FDI and curb loan defaults, MFIs can viably support
entrepreneurship among the poor.

Introduction
Emerging markets are home to roughly 84 percent of the world's population (World Bank, 2011).
Although emerging markets are a source of future investment, growth, and entrepreneurial potential
(Alon & McIntyre, 2004; Welsh & Alon, 2001), much of this potential is at the bottom of the pyramid
(BoP)—the poorest tier of the world's economic pyramid. The BoP comprises more than four billion
people, or around 65 percent of the world's population, who earn less than $3,000 each per year
(Hammond, Kramer, Katz, Tran, & Walker, 2007, p. 3;Prahalad & Hammond, 2002, p. 51). Further, the
individuals living in, and the businesses operating at, the BoP often suffer due to the presence of
institutional voids. Institutional voids exists in contexts where “institutional arrangement[s] that support
markets are either absent or weak” (Mair & Marti, 2009, p. 41), which may arise from “the absence of
specialized intermediaries, regulatory systems, and contract-enforcing mechanisms” (Khanna, Palepu, &
Sinha, 2005, p. 63). Despite the bleak scenario, the relatively untapped population of four billion people
at the BoP represents a consumer base with a purchasing power of more than $5 trillion per year
(Hammond et al., 2007, p. 3; World Bank, 2011). Hence, despite the challenges, there is considerable
entrepreneurial opportunity for the aspiring poor at the BoP (Kiymaz, Alon, & Theodore Veit,
2009; Prahalad & Hart, 2002).
Entrepreneurship in emerging markets is unique because BoP entrepreneurs generally create
microenterprises of “few employees, few assets, and informal operations” (Gudz, 1999, p. 1). Yet
institutional voids preclude many BoP entrepreneurs from access to (1) financial resources and (2)
knowledge resources, which are needed to create and grow microenterprises. That is, BoP
entrepreneurs lack access to financial markets (Mair, Martí, & Ventresca, 2012), but also may lack any

formal education or training (Afrin, Islam, & Ahmed, 2010). In response to the first institutional void
(lack of access to financial resources), the microfinance industry has surfaced as a potential response.
Microfinance is defined as the business of providing “loans, savings, and other basic financial services to
the poor,” where the dollar amounts tend to be small (micro) in size (Consultative Group to Assist the
Poor [CGAP], 2011). Impoverished borrowers may use the microfinance loans either for meeting their
consumption needs or for building microenterprises (Bartik, 2009; Karlan & Valdivia, 2011). Hence,
microfinance institutions (MFIs) help fill the institutional void of lack of access to finance faced by
impoverished people at the BoP (Efird, 2008).
Though the microfinance movement stemmed from the aspiring poor's lack of access to financial
markets, MFIs are increasingly offering supplementary nonfinancial support services to borrowers. One
such service imparts supplementary knowledge support, often with the purpose of providing support to
borrowers to become effective entrepreneurs. This support helps fill the second institutional void—the
lack of access to knowledge resources among impoverished individuals at the BoP. Accordingly, at least
two strategies of microfinance are possible: (1) a basic strategy: provide only standard financial services
to borrowers, or (2) a supplemented strategy: support entrepreneurship among borrowers by providing
knowledge resources in addition to providing standard financial services. Given these two strategies, a
question arises: Is the supplemented strategy worthwhile for MFIs? That is, is it appropriate for MFIs
(that, by definition, provide financial resources) to go the extra mile and provide knowledge resources to
encourage entrepreneurship at the BoP?
Recent research on the outcomes for MFIs of going beyond their basic mission of providing financial
resources and supporting BoP entrepreneurship by offering knowledge resources, is often focused on
the outcomes for the BoP entrepreneur, and shows mixed results. For example, research on the
socioeconomic impacts of microfinance suggests that borrowers with more education and experience
related to business are better able to manage the loans borrowed and the microenterprises created
(Hietalahti & Linden, 2006). Further, research suggests that microfinance programs that also provide
knowledge services to borrowers motivate the borrower to be entrepreneurial (Afrin et al., 2010).
However, in a quasi-experimental study of group-lending in Peru, researchers have found that providing
impoverished borrowers with entrepreneurial and business training in addition to financial support had
limited effects on the entrepreneurial success of the borrower (Karlan & Valdivia, 2011). From our
perspective, however, lacking from the literature is an understanding of the effect of providing
knowledge support on the outcomes of the MFI. That is, MFIs can offer supplementary knowledge
support services, but at what cost? Understanding the relationship between providing knowledge
support to encourage entrepreneurship and costs of operating at the BoP is an unexplored area of
research. Further, given that these MFIs operate in emerging markets, we suggest that contextual
factors may play a role in explaining the viability for MFIs of providing knowledge support to encourage
entrepreneurship.
In this study, we define MFI's knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship as the extent to which
an MFI offers various knowledge resources in order to encourage entrepreneurship among its BoP
borrowers. We define MFI's costs of operating at the BoP as the MFI's aggregate operational costs that
include the personnel, administrative, travel, and other costs involved in monitoring the ability of its
impoverished borrowers to repay the loan (Agarwal, 2006; Shankar, 2007). We argue that the outcome
of an MFI's knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship might be an increase in the MFI's costs of
operating at the BoP. This is because entrepreneurial ventures by impoverished borrowers, like most

forms of entrepreneurship, are risky propositions where failure is a realistic outcome. Failure in the
entrepreneurial venture could jeopardize the borrower's loan repayment. Failure might also damage the
credibility and reputation of the knowledge support provided by the MFI. Thus, in providing knowledge
support to encourage entrepreneurship, MFIs may incur additional costs associated with operating at
the BoP.
More important, we argue that contextual factors might play a role in the viability of MFIs offering
knowledge support. Given that MFIs operate in emerging markets, understanding the importance of
context is necessary to gain better understanding of the relationship between MFIs' knowledge support
to encourage entrepreneurship and the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. We consider (1) foreign
direct investment (FDI) and (2) loan defaults as the contextual factors that moderate this association.
We define FDI as the extent to which the country where the MFI operates attracts outside investment
(Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], 2008). We define loan defaults as
borrowers' reluctance or inability to pay off loans procured from MFIs, reflected in write-offs of the
uncollectable loans by the MFIs. We argue that in unfavorable contexts (where FDI is low and loan
defaults are high), it might be burdensome, and thus costly, for MFIs to provide knowledge support to
encourage entrepreneurship. In contrast, when FDI is high and loan defaults are low, the knowledge and
financial services provided to BoP entrepreneurs can potentially better facilitate the creation and
growth of successful microenterprises without aggravating the MFIs' operating costs.
In sum, our article highlights that MFIs can attempt to support BoP entrepreneurship, but will also face
tremendous challenges in emerging markets. We describe why we believe contextual factors may be
important for the future success of MFIs, and resultantly, BoP entrepreneurs, and how they are relevant
to the development of entrepreneurship in emerging markets. The coming sections provide the
theoretical arguments, research methodology, and empirical results. The final section discusses the
implications of the findings in relation to the broader literature and practice. We highlight the need for
governments to create a favorable environment for MFIs—a modern socioeconomic environment that is
(1) welcoming of and conducive for FDI and (2) discourages loan defaults.
Theory Development and Hypotheses
Though microfinance is often viewed as a promising mechanism to help alleviate poverty and incite
entrepreneurial activity at the BoP (Salimath, 2010), the industry is plagued with high operational costs
associated with providing support to BoP borrowers in inchoate emerging markets (Morduch,
2000; Shankar, 2007). MFIs' costs of operating at the BoP include all costs associated with providing
support to BoP borrowers, from costs to secure funds for lending to costs associated with collecting
repayments (Shankar, 2007). Though they face high costs, MFIs can help alleviate poverty and improve
economic and social welfare, particularly in emerging markets that are institutionally weak (Goldberg,
2005; Schreiner, 2002).
Supporting Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets: Background on MFIs
MFIs operate in various forms, which are illustrated in Table 1. MFIs, by definition, offer financial
services. The services offered by MFIs can range from loans to other basic financial services including
insurance and savings (CGAP, 2011; MIX Market, 2010; Zardkoohi, Bierman, Panina, & Chakrabarty,
2011), as well as non-financial services such as to offer supplementary knowledge support to encourage
entrepreneurship (Goldberg, 2005; Robinson, 2001). The MFI's choice to offer supplementary

knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship among BoP borrowers has received recent attention
in the literature (Afrin et al., 2010; Karlan & Valdivia, 2011; Morduch, 2000). Additionally, the cost of
operating at the BoP has become a focal point within this field of inquiry (Agarwal, 2006; Shankar, 2007).
This includes the cost associated with post-lending monitoring, such as traveling to and taking time to
visit with impoverished borrowers to monitor their loan usage and repayment capacity (Agarwal,
2006; Akula, 2008). MFIs that provide knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship may be the
catalyst for economic development in emerging markets (Carland & Carland, 2004); however, in doing
so, these MFIs may incur additional costs associated with operating at the BoP.

As noted earlier, MFIs can adopt two strategies: one in which the MFI follows its basic mission of solely
providing financial services, and the other in which MFIs provide supplementary knowledge services in
addition to financial services to its borrowers. The former “basic” MFI strategy is specifically focused on
the past and present financial status of the borrower. That is, the purpose of the transaction between
the MFI and borrowers is to provide borrowers, who are determined creditworthy, with loans. These
loans might be used to start microenterprises. However, less than half of microfinance loans are used
for such purposes. Thus, these loans are more likely to be used to stabilize consumption, pay education
fees and medical expenses, or for life events including weddings and funerals (Bartik, 2009; CGAP,
2011; Karlan & Zinman, 2012). As a result, the only expectation of the transaction between the MFI and
the borrower is that the loan can be repaid and costs incurred from monitoring the repayment of this
loan will be moderate. These MFIs are not concerned with how the financial services provided are used,
but rather that the loans provided to BoP borrowers are recoverable. The focus of these MFIs is largely
on verifying prelending creditworthiness (e.g., to check whether the borrower's current occupation
assures a stable/nonvolatile source of income) and negotiating a stable postlending repayment
schedule.
The latter “supplemented” strategy, which encourages entrepreneurship by additionally providing
knowledge resources to borrowers, focuses not just on the past and present financial status of the
borrower but also on the borrower's future entrepreneurial plans. MFIs that choose to provide
impoverished borrowers with knowledge services in addition to financial services do so to equip these
borrowers with the tools necessary to take the risks needed to create and grow microenterprises. Both
knowledge and education are antecedents to entrepreneurial venture creation and success (Davidsson
& Honig, 2003; Robinson & Sexton, 1994). Thus, this MFI strategy creates an expectation that the
borrower will utilize both the knowledge and financial services provided to take on the risk of building or

supporting an entrepreneurial venture. As a result and motivated by the knowledge support from the
MFI that encourages entrepreneurship, the impoverished borrower may attempt entrepreneurship.
However, there is always a hazard that an impoverished borrower, like borrowers in more developed
markets, might be ultimately manifested as an “incompetent fool” rather than a “dynamic
entrepreneur” (Lynch-Fannon, 2009, p. 67).
Even if the impoverished borrower were to be inherently competent, the fact remains that attempting
entrepreneurship is always a risky proposition, where failure is a part of the game. Thus, from the
perspective of the MFI and in comparison to the former strategy, adoption of this strategy might
aggravate the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. To ensure that the loan is repayable, the MFI must
continually monitor the borrower's ability to utilize the loan effectively for entrepreneurship. The MFI
has to monitor the borrower in order to protect itself from the potential incompetence of the borrower
in entrepreneurial activities that could jeopardize the borrower's loan repayment.
Contextual Factors that Influence the Relationship between the MFI's Knowledge Support to Encourage
Entrepreneurship and the Costs of Operating at the BoP
Contextual factors are increasingly important in understanding the complexities surrounding
entrepreneurship in emerging markets (Petricević & Danis, 2007; Tan, 2002; Zdravkovic & Amine, 2007).
We examine contagion effects arising from contextual factors that may moderate the influence of an
MFI's knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship on the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. For
instance, FDI has been shown to play an important role in the economic development and national
welfare of the recipient country (Hu & Jefferson, 2002; Meyer, 2004; Zhou, Li, & Tse, 2002), particularly
in contexts with weak institutional markets (Stoever, 2005). Countries that are able to attract FDI can
increase local productivity and quality of jobs, increase per-capita income, and improve working
conditions; all of which are indicative of a positive climate for investment and business. Alternatively,
contexts that are unsupportive of FDI may produce more difficulties for both MFIs and BoP
entrepreneurs to survive. However, the presence of FDI in emerging markets does not always create
ideal business climates. FDI in emerging markets can create complexities for contracts (Cooke, 1997),
local business owners (Guruswamy, Sharma, Mohanty, & Korah, 2006), and capital flight (Almounsor,
2007; Kant, 1996). We expand on these issues raised by the presence of FDI in emerging markets in
Table 2.

Microfinance can be influential in equipping BoP entrepreneurs with the financial and knowledge
resources needed to create and grow successful microenterprises in weak institutional arrangements.

Thus, contexts that are politically and socially supportive of microfinance can aid in MFIs' ability to reach
the aspiring poor. For example, microfinance produces many socioeconomic benefits across contexts,
such as creating social value through poverty alleviation, increased education, and improved health
initiatives (Goldberg, 2005; Robinson, 2001), and economic value through development of both hard
and soft infrastructure as well as incitement of other entrepreneurial activity (Afrin et al., 2010).
However, contexts that are politically and socially unsupportive of microfinance have spurred
controversies in emerging markets stimulating political and social backlash against microfinance as
indicated in Table 3.

Thus, contextual factors can be important in examining MFIs' knowledge support to encourage
entrepreneurship and the costs associated with operating at the BoP. As such, we examine two
contextual factors, FDI and loan defaults, as influencing this relationship.
Contextual Contingency: Foreign Direct Investment
Tables 2 and 3 highlighted the misgivings that FDI might generate in the recipient emerging markets.
We, however, believe that such misgivings are unfortunate. FDI can be tremendously beneficial, with
the benefits documented and highlighted consistently in the international business literature. The
presence of FDI is influential in the social and economic development of emerging markets, especially as

related to entrepreneurship (Acs & Szerb, 2007; Yiu, ChungMing, & Bruton, 2007). In emerging markets
with higher FDI inflow, there are positive contagion effects that result in the dispersion of widespread
benefits. Though microentrepreneurs, or entrepreneurs that create and grow microenterprises, may not
be the direct recipients of such FDI, the presence of FDI within an emerging market can strengthen
financial markets (Chakrabarty, 2009; Goldberg, 2004; Kuroda & Kawai, 2002), and assist social and
economic development (Borensztein, De Gregorio, & Lee, 1998; Ozawa, 1992). As a result, a contagion
effect of FDI inflow exists such that FDI strengthens the business climate of the emerging market to
create knowledge spillovers (Chakrabarty & Whitten, 2011; Fabry & Zeghni, 2003; Whitten, Chakrabarty,
& Wakefield, 2010), makes the market more competitive, assists the development of new institutions,
and alters markets and systems to be more efficient and effective (Almor, 2011; Chakrabarty & Wang,
2012; Grachev, Rogovsky, & Bobina, 2006). While FDI can result in greater formal/contractual business
opportunities in the host country, there are also positive spillovers that arise from “non-market
transactions when resources, notably knowledge, are spread without a contractual relationship”
(Meyer, 2004, p. 260). Thus, in emerging markets in which FDI is present, MFIs may find it easier to
operate in such contexts.
In emerging markets where FDI inflow is higher, MFIs may feel more comfortable going beyond their
basic mission of providing financial services to additionally provide knowledge support to encourage
entrepreneurship. MFIs that operate in contexts where FDI is higher may be better equipped to provide
knowledge in addition to financial services to BoP borrowers because the MFI itself is operating in a
stronger financial market that is more conducive for economic and social development. Further, in this
context MFIs may provide knowledge in addition to financial support to BoP borrowers. This is because
the MFI believes that the context is such that it creates a favorable business climate for BoP borrowers,
and that BoP borrowers will be able to translate these knowledge and financial services into successful
microenterprises. Thus, MFIs that provide knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship in
contexts with higher FDI may experience lesser costs associated with operating at the BoP because the
investment climate is more conducive for BoP entrepreneurship. As such, it is less risky for these BoP
borrowers to create and grow successful microenterprises. A positive investment and business climate
would reduce the concern in MFIs about the ability of these BoP borrowers to translate the knowledge
and financial services provided to create and grow successful microenterprises.
In contrast, in countries where FDI inflow is low, MFIs are more likely to be concerned about the ability
of these BoP borrowers to translate the knowledge and financial services provided to create and grow
successful microenterprises. In these contexts, MFIs may incur higher costs associated with operating at
the BoP because they are wary of the ability of these BoP borrowers to translate the knowledge services
in addition to the financial services provided to create and grow successful microenterprises, but also in
their ability to repay the loans. As such, these MFIs may go to greater lengths to ensure the knowledge
and financial services are creating and growing successful microenterprises, but also that the borrower
has the ability to repay the loan. As a result, we suggest that FDI may be instrumental in moderating the
association between MFIs' knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship and the MFI's costs of
operating at the BoP. Thus, we propose:
Hypothesis 1: FDI moderates the influence of an MFI's knowledge support to encourage
entrepreneurship on the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. The influence is more strongly positive
when FDI is lower.

Contextual Contingency: Loan Defaults
Loan defaults are a challenging problem in emerging markets. Given the high costs of operating in
regions with poor infrastructure and facilities, MFIs in emerging markets typically charge high interest
rates from borrowers (Dehejia, Montgomery, & Morduch, 2012; Fernando, 2006; Morduch, 2000).
Further, emerging markets also face higher levels of political, social, and economic risks, all of which
make it difficult for both MFIs and entrepreneurs to do business. Finally, because of inefficient litigation
in dysfunctional courts, contracts are difficult to enforce. As such, violators are not fearful to breach
contracts. Thus, in emerging markets, loan defaults can be a major problem. Some BoP entrepreneurs
may genuinely struggle to repay MFI loans, whereas some BoP entrepreneurs may be reluctant to repay
MFI loans even if they have the money to do so. This may give rise to borrowers not repaying loans to
MFIs, resulting in write-offs of the loans (Field & Pande, 2008; Rosenberg, 2009).
The inability and/or reluctance of borrowers to repay loans exposes a potentially dark side of
microfinance and BoP entrepreneurship. First, consider the genuine inability of borrowers to repay
loans. Both social and political elements within an emerging market may spur effects that contribute to
loan defaults. BoP entrepreneurs may not be able to repay loans borrowed from MFIs, creating grave
social effects such as riots, deterioration of community relationships, and even suicide and death
(Hulme, 2000; Montgomery, 1996). Thus, social consequences of the inability to repay MFI loans may
prevent other borrowers from repaying existing loans or taking out new loans. In addition to social
effects, political effects may influence the climate for entrepreneurship.
Second, consider the reluctance of borrowers to repay loans (Futagami & Helms, 2009). Increasingly,
there are instances where politicians in emerging markets—often influenced by communist, socialist,
and anticapitalist ideologies—discourage borrowers from repaying loans. Political leaders, government
officials, and activists accuse MFIs of being exploitative and greedy. The politically spurred backlash
against microfinance can either motivate or scare borrowers into not repaying loans, resulting in
nonrecoverable loans for MFIs (Sparreboom, 2011). The MFIs, in the face of such political uncertainty
and potential threat of loan defaults, react by redoubling their loan-monitoring efforts.
Thus, political and social factors influencing loan defaults may create contagion effects that impact the
relationship between MFIs' knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship and the MFI's costs of
operating at the BoP. Accordingly, we suggest:
Hypothesis 2: Loan defaults moderate the influence of an MFI's knowledge support to encourage
entrepreneurship on the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. The influence is more strongly positive
when loan defaults are higher.
Methods
Sample and Procedure
Our sample consists of MFIs in emerging countries in five regions: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, East
Asia, South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East. Data on the selected MFIs are
collected by the MIX, a nonprofit private organization that promotes information sharing and
transparency for the microfinance industry on financial and social performance for MFIs (MIX Market,
2010). Our data set uses both financial data and annual survey data on MFIs provided by the MIX.

Financial data is either directly submitted to the MIX by each MFI (or by the affiliated network that files
on the MFI's behalf) or gathered by the MIX from public documents published by the MFI (such as
annual reports). The MIX supplements these data with archival documents, such as ratings, annual
reports, donor/investor reports, and audits to capture market dynamics as well as more integrated
performance data of individual MFIs. Data are validated by more than 100 quality checks and
standardized by the MIX in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The data
are then made publicly available through the MIX website (MIX Market, 2010).
Annual survey data are voluntarily provided to the MIX by the MFI or its affiliated network. Data are
submitted through the data submission form (if a first-time submitter) or the profile update form (if the
institution has previously submitted data to the MIX). Both forms are made publicly available on the MIX
website. Annual survey data consist of information on services provided by MFIs, governance structure,
and social performance indicators. The MIX began collecting annual survey data voluntarily from MFIs in
2008.
A longitudinal panel data set is created by merging three databases: the MIX annual survey data for
years 2008 and 2009, the MIX financial indicators database for years 2008 through 2010, and the World
Bank Development Indicators database for the relevant years. The sample size is dictated by the extent
of overlap among the merged databases and the availability of non-missing data for the variables of
interest. The merged panel dataset allows a sample size of 136 firm-years.
Table 4 provides the sample characteristics. The MFIs included in this sample are distributed across 31
countries, with MFIs from the Latin American region having largest representation. The World Bank
(2011) defines high-income countries as those with gross national product (GNP) per capita greater than
$12,275. None of the MFIs in our sample operate in high-income countries. Furthermore, we verified
that the MFIs in our sample function primarily in the poorer regions within their respective countries
(the MIX website provides contact information for each MFI and displays the regions where the MFI
operates). Fifty-six percent of the MFIs in our sample are non-profit organizations and 44 percent are
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The sample means of financial and operational data suggest
that an average MFI is a relatively small organization (in terms of total assets and number of employees)
with a very strong focus on the microfinance business (approximately 93 percent of operations is in
microfinance).

Measures of Variables in Hypotheses
MFI's Costs of Operating at the BoP
A substantial portion of the operating expense of MFIs functioning at the BoP of emerging markets is the
cost of monitoring borrowers. Monitoring of borrowers is important for MFIs to assess and manage their
risk exposure, especially because borrowers often lack property that can be pledged as collateral. Thus,
monitoring is necessary to ensure that borrowers make their payments on time. This may involve MFI
personnel traveling from village to village at regular intervals to meet borrowers to assess their payment

capacity (Akula, 2008). The locations are usually difficult and time consuming to reach due to the tough
terrains, geographic dispersion, and lack of pubic infrastructure and transportation, all of which increase
the MFI's operational costs. Accordingly, an MFI's costs of operating at the BoP is measured as the MFI's
operational cost per borrower, calculated as the ratio of the annual operating expense to number of
active borrowers. The numerator, operating expense, is the expense related to operations, including all
personnel, travel, and administrative expenses. The denominator, number of active borrowers, is the
number of individuals or entities who currently have an outstanding loan balance with the MFI or are
primarily responsible for repaying any portion of the MFI's gross loan portfolio. An individual/entity that
has multiple loans with an MFI is counted as a single borrower.
MFI's Knowledge Support to Encourage Entrepreneurship
MFI's knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship is measured as the aggregate number of
various knowledge resources offered by the MFI to support BoP entrepreneurship. The value of this
variable is zero for MFIs that provide only financial services. The value of this variable is greater than
zero for MFIs that provide knowledge resources for BoP entrepreneurship, in addition to providing
financial services. The knowledge resources fall into the following categories as indicated by MIX (MIX
Market, 2010):
•

Enterprise skills development knowledge: Includes vocational training, technical and
management skills courses to develop small-scale enterprises.

•

Business development knowledge: Includes information, training, business advice, consulting
and marketing services, assistance with information and communications technology (ICT),
technical assistance, and business links.

•

Financial literacy knowledge: Training that addresses topics related to financial planning,
savings, investments, borrowings, budgets, interest rates, and so on.

•

Occupational health and safety knowledge: Training that aims to inform local entrepreneurs
about how to ensure safe and healthy working conditions.

The value of the variable is increased for each knowledge resource provided by the MFI. That is, an MFI
receives one point for each of the categories, which allows for a maximum score of 4 points.
Note that a zero score for this measure is a meaningful value—the MFI is fixed to the basic strategy (i.e.,
providing only standard financial services to borrowers). A nonzero score also has meaning. It means
that the MFI is attempting to (go beyond the basic strategy in order to) adopt the supplemented
strategy (i.e., support entrepreneurship among borrowers by providing knowledge resources in addition
to providing standard financial services). Toward this end, different MFIs can choose to provide different
kinds of knowledge resources. Our measure attempts to capture a wide array of knowledge resource
possibilities. For example, enterprise skill development is proven to be an important factor in developing
BoP entrepreneurship (Afrin et al., 2010). Similarly, business development and financial literacy
demonstrate increased knowledge in BoP entrepreneurs (Karlan & Valdivia, 2011). MFIs can provide
knowledge to BoP entrepreneurs on occupational health and safety to limit the BoP entrepreneurs'
health and safety risks in addition to the MFI's lending risks (Wenner, Wright, & Lal, 2004). By providing
one or more of these knowledge resources, MFIs can help to support entrepreneurship in emerging
markets.

Foreign Direct Investment in the Country
This is measured as ratio of the FDI (foreign direct investment) inflow to gross domestic product (GDP)
of the country where the MFI functions. The numerator, FDI inflow, is an aggregate of equity capital,
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the country's
balance of payments (World Bank, 2011). The denominator is the country's GDP. FDI inflow is a
macroeconomic indicator, which, if favorable, provides a better business climate for MFIs and also
greater opportunities to create viable microenterprises for BoP entrepreneurs (Havranek & Irsova,
2010). Inflow of FDI is both an indication of and a contributor to better investment climates, improving
productivity of the country (Zhao & Zhang, 2010), lowering unemployment (Chaudhuri, Yabuuchi, &
Mukhopadhyay, 2006), increasing foreign exchange earnings (Ram & Zhang, 2002), and expanding
domestic investment (Mah, 2010). Moreover, creation and ownership of businesses has been shown to
be more advantageous in countries that have higher levels of FDI inflow (Yiu et al., 2007). The better
investment climate fosters stronger business relationships, which is important for MFIs, as well as for
BoP entrepreneurs by providing them more opportunities.
Loan Defaults
Loan defaults are reflected in the extent of write-offs due to uncollectable loans. It is measured using
the MFI's write-off ratio, which is the ratio of write-offs to the gross loan portfolio. The numerator is the
total amount of loans written off during the year. A write-off is an accounting procedure that removes
the outstanding balance of the loan from the loan portfolio and from the impairment loss allowance
when these loans are recognized as uncollectable. The denominator is the gross loan portfolio, which is
the aggregate of all outstanding principals due for all outstanding client loans. It includes current,
delinquent, and renegotiated loans, but does not include loans that have been written off and does not
include interest receivable.
Control Variables
Firm Dummies
The regressions used for this study are one-way fixed effects regressions, which automatically generate
dummies for each firm (MFI). By using each firm as its own control, the regression controls for all stable
characteristics of the firms and uses only within-firm variation to estimate the regression coefficients.
MFI Size
Size of the MFI is included as a control because larger MFIs are likely to have a greater influence among
the community and other stakeholders. Further, while larger size allows for greater economies of scale,
it can also result in a lack of focus and management/coordination problems. Hence, we control for firm
size, measured as ln (total assets), where total assets is in dollars.
MFI Return on Assets
An MFI's return on assets is measured as a ratio. The numerator is a firm's net income, which is the
annual income or loss reported by a firm on its income statement after subtracting expenses and losses
from all revenues and gains. The denominator is total assets, which represents the total assets/liabilities
of a firm, as reported on its balance sheet. Though return on assets is an appropriate performance
measure in the management literature, it is often considered a somewhat inappropriate measure of

performance in the microfinance literature because the majority of MFIs receive substantial subsidies.
As a result, the question of whether MFIs can sustainably operate without subsidies becomes more
critical than whether the MFI is able to deploy its assets profitably (Rosenberg, 2009). Hence, we
relegated the return on assets measure to a control variable.
Country Prosperity
Country prosperity is an indicator of economic wealth and quality of life, and is negatively related to
poverty. Country prosperity is calculated as GDP per capita in constant U.S. dollars, based on purchasing
power parity. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products
(World Bank, 2011).
Country Mortality
The country mortality rate is measured as the crude death rate for the country, or the number of deaths
occurring during the year, per 1,000 population estimated at midyear (World Brank, 2011). This human
factor measure, in contrast to the financial measure of country prosperity, is an indicator of poverty and
poor health infrastructure in the emerging market (Cabigon, 2005).
Results
We hypothesized that the influence of MFI's knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship on the
MFI's costs of operating at the BoP is contingent on levels of FDI in the emerging market and loan
defaults. In the MIX survey database, annual data for the predictor variable (MFI's knowledge support to
encourage entrepreneurship) is available for the period 2008–2009. Following standard practice to
indicate the direction of influence, the data used for control variables and independent variables are
lagged behind the data for the dependent variable by one year. Hence, data for the dependent variable
(MFI's costs of operating at the BoP) are obtained for the period 2009–2010 from the MIX financials
database.
Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for our study. One-way fixed effect
regressions are used to test the hypotheses, the results of which are included in Table 6. For the
regressions, all the variables were standardized (with mean set to zero) to avoid multicollinearity
problems and to obtain standardized parameter estimates. The independent variables were lagged
behind the dependent variable by one year, to indicate the longitudinal direction of the effects being
tested. Figure 1 provides the interaction plots (the moderator variables are continuous, but only the
lines representing high and low values of the moderators are plotted for ease of visualization).

Figure 1. Interaction Plots: MFI's Knowledge Support to Encourage Entrepreneurship

We find support that both of our contextual factors significantly moderate the influence of an MFI's
knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship on the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. First,
consistent with hypothesis 1, FDI inflow moderates the influence of an MFI's knowledge support to
encourage entrepreneurship on the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP (β = −0.10 with p < 0.05 in model
M4 and β = −0.09 with p < 0.05 in model M6 in Table 5). As shown in the interaction plot in Figure 1, the
influence of an MFI's knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship on the MFI's costs of operating
at the BoP is significantly positive when FDI is low (simple slope = 17.44, p < 0.05). Hence, an MFI's costs
of operating at the BoP are greatest when it attempts to provide knowledge support to encourage
entrepreneurship in a country where FDI is low.
Second, consistent with hypothesis 2, loan defaults moderate the influence of an MFI's knowledge
support to encourage entrepreneurship on the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP (β = 0.10 with p
< 0.05 in model M5 and β = 0.08 with p < 0.10 in model M6 in Table r5). As shown in the interaction plot
in Figure 1, the influence of an MFI's knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship on the MFI's
costs of operating at the BoP is significantly positive when loan defaults are high (simple slope = 24.36, p
< 0.05). Hence, an MFI's costs of operating at the BoP are greatest when it tries to provide knowledge
support to encourage BoP entrepreneurship in a context where loan defaults are high.
In sum, the results in Table 6 and interaction plots in Figure 1 suggest that MFI's costs of operating at
the BoP are greatest when it attempts to provide knowledge support to encourage BoP
entrepreneurship in unfavorable contexts (low FDI and high loan defaults).
Discussion
Our results suggest that the influence of an MFI's knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship on
the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP is strengthened when FDI is high and loan defaults are low. This
study builds on previous research to address the role of microfinance institutions by going beyond their
basic mission of providing financial services to also provide knowledge support to encourage
entrepreneurship. We extend this research by examining contextual factors that may influence the
relationship between providing such support and costs incurred for MFIs. We discuss the implications
and future research avenues in the following paragraphs.
Theoretical Contributions and Implications
Our findings make several important contributions. First, we focus on contextual factors that play a role
in emerging markets. Mixed results on attempts to encourage entrepreneurship in emerging markets,
especially by microfinance institutions, direct our attention toward contextual factors that may aid in
accounting for such variation in results. Our results suggest that going beyond their basic mission of
providing finance services to additionally provide knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship
can become a burden for MFIs in contexts that are unfavorable (i.e., in contexts where FDI is low and
loan defaults are high). While the intentions might be good, by attempting to provide knowledge
support to encourage entrepreneurship in such unfavorable contexts, MFIs might in fact be operating in
bleak contexts, but also may be giving “false hope” to borrowers. This is because the chance of
entrepreneurial success in such unfavorable contexts is low. The false hope given to impoverished
borrowers—that they can become successful entrepreneurs in unfavorable contexts—might only serve
to increase the MFIs' costs of operating at the BoP, and perhaps drive both the aspiring entrepreneurs

and the MFIs toward financial ruin. This is an unfortunate scenario where good intentions can be
thwarted by harsh realities.
Nonetheless, we believe that there is hope for MFIs and BoP borrowers—if governments make efforts to
improve the contexts. As our results illustrate, providing knowledge support to encourage
entrepreneurship is worthwhile for MFIs in contexts where FDI is high and loan defaults are low. This is
because in such contexts, supporting BoP entrepreneurship does not contribute to the MFIs' costs of
operating at the BoP. When FDI is high and loan defaults are low, the business climate is more conducive
for the services provided by MFIs. As such, the knowledge and financial services provided to BoP
entrepreneurs can better facilitate the creation and growth of successful microenterprises because the
overall climate is one that is favorable for entrepreneurship. Governments can help remedy the harsh
realities by working toward creating a modern socio-economic environment that (1) is welcoming of and
conducive for FDI and (2) discourages loan defaults.
Second, we address contagion effects as related to entrepreneurship in emerging markets rife with
institutional voids. Contagion effects can be used to understand why some contexts are crafted of an
institutional fabric that makes sense for MFIs to go out of their way to encourage BoP entrepreneurship
and why others do not. Though BoP borrowers and even MFIs may not directly benefit from FDI inflows
in the countries in which they operate, the existence of FDI in these contexts creates contagion effects
that can aid in explaining how FDI inflows can create business and investment climates that are
conducive for entrepreneurship. We argue that a business and investment climate that is more
conducive for BoP entrepreneurship enables MFIs to additionally provide knowledge support to
encourage entrepreneurship without adding to the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. It is true that the
largest proportion of FDI flows into industries dominated by large corporate entities. As a result, many
MFIs and BoP entrepreneurs may not be the direct beneficiaries of FDI. Nevertheless, MFIs and BoP
entrepreneurs may still benefit from FDI inflows into their country because of contagion effects.
Contagion effects help explain how the business, knowledge, and resources gained by the large
corporate entities through FDI ultimately strengthen the social and economic context in the host
country, eventually impacting smaller businesses (such as MFIs) and even the smallest entrepreneur.
Furthermore, the ability and/or willingness of BoP entrepreneurs to repay loans can be influenced by
contagion effects arising from political and social climates of emerging markets (illustrated in Table 3).
When BoP entrepreneurs are motivated to not repay loans, it results in the MFIs having to increase the
monitoring of their borrowers. The MFIs must invest more in postlending monitoring to ensure that BoP
entrepreneurs are successful in creating and growing microenterprises and comply with the contractual
obligations of repaying loans.
Third, we address the difficulties of encouraging BoP entrepreneurship in emerging markets. In
emerging markets characterized by institutional arrangements where investment climate is poor (as
evidenced by low FDI), social and economic development is stifled (De Mello, 1997), and financial
markets are weaker. Such emerging markets fail to gain positive social, financial, and economic benefits
from the presence of MFIs that attempt to encourage BoP entrepreneurship. In emerging markets
where loan defaults are high, MFIs become concerned and intensify their costly loan monitoring efforts
(Fernando, 2006). As a result, both MFIs and the aspiring entrepreneurs may find it difficult to operate
as viable enterprises and survive. This may result in both MFIs and microentrepreneurs being choked
out of the underdeveloped and financially weak system (Korosteleva, 2009; Lin, 2010).

Finally, this study has noteworthy implications regarding the viability of microfinance as a tool to boost
microentrepreneurship for poverty alleviation in emerging markets. Positioning our findings in the
related research, we believe we provide insight to the question of “mission drift” in microfinance
research (Morduch, 2000; Prahalad & Hart, 2002). Mission drift is a phenomenon in which MFIs struggle
to simultaneously (1) encourage BoP entrepreneurship for poverty alleviation at the BoP and (2)
continue to operate as a viable microfinance business. We believe that it is possible for MFIs to pursue
both objectives; however, it is contingent on contextual factors, such as FDI and loan defaults. MFIs may
experience mission drift in institutional arrangements in which the political or social climate encourages
BoP entrepreneurs to not repay loans, or when the economy lacks the presence of FDI. Thus, while we
agree that MFIs can and should seek to simultaneously alleviate poverty and operate as viable
businesses, they may face tremendous difficulties in doing so in emerging markets with low FDI and high
loan defaults.
Implications for Practice
We believe that our study also has important implications for practice. We deem the BoP to be a rich
source of business and entrepreneurial activity that should not be ignored (Prahalad, 2010; Prahalad &
Hammond, 2002; Prahalad & Hart, 2002). In particular, “businesses can gain three important advantages
by serving the poor—a new source of revenue growth, greater efficiency, and access to innovation,”
(Prahalad & Hammond, 2002, p. 6). Governments and political leaders of emerging markets can help by
creating an environment that welcomes FDI and discourages the nonrepayment of loans. This could
motivate MFIs to provide knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship without the fear of
significant costs incurred from operating at the BoP. We believe that providing knowledge support to
encourage entrepreneurship can aid the aspiring poor to create viable microenterprises, but urge MFIs
to understand the contextual factors that influence the environments in which they operate.
Specifically, as a precondition of entry and operation in an emerging market, MFIs should advocate for
conditions that welcome FDI and discourage nonpayment of loans to government and political leaders.
Otherwise, the MFIs may find themselves in a tailspin of uncontrollable costs and bad debt, hurting their
ability to continually encourage BoP entrepreneurship. Thus, it is crucial that MFIs manage client and
government relationships in manner that is consistent with the context in which they operate (Rottig,
2007).
Limitations and Future Research
Our data allow us to investigate the importance of contextual factors in the relationship between
providing knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship by MFIs and the costs of operating at the
BoP. Our study presents some limitations that can be addressed by future research. First, we explore
microfinance-led entrepreneurship in emerging markets. Though microfinance is an important catalyst
of BoP entrepreneurship, it is not the only available mechanism in these markets. Thus, future research
may investigate the relationships suggested by this study in relation to entrepreneurship that is not
aided by microfinance. Second, while we chose to focus on two contextual factors, we believe that other
contextual factors could also play a role. We chose the two contextual factors based on extant academic
and practitioner-oriented coverage of these contextual factors (Bajaj, 2011; Bateman, 2011; de Sam
Lazaro, 2011; Goldstein, 2011; Sharpe & Schwart, 2011). Future studies should investigate alternative
contextual and organizational factors to build on the groundwork laid by this study's findings
(Chakrabarty, in press; Chakrabarty & Bass, in press; Chakrabarty & Wang, in press).

Conclusion
The bottom of the pyramid is often overlooked as a potential source for business opportunities and
entrepreneurial activity. What is more, contextual factors can play a role in the viability of
entrepreneurship in emerging markets rife with institutional voids. We argue that FDI and loan defaults
act as moderators in the association between an MFI's knowledge support to encourage
entrepreneurship and the MFI's costs of operating at the BoP. Providing knowledge support to
encourage entrepreneurship is challenging, and might not be worthwhile for MFIs functioning in
contexts where FDI is low and loan defaults are high. This is because it would add to the MFI's costs of
operating at the BoP, which could ultimately make the MFI unviable, and give false hope to struggling
BoP entrepreneurs. In contrast, providing knowledge support to encourage entrepreneurship is feasible
in contexts where FDI is high and loan defaults are low because it does not contribute to the MFI's costs
of operating at the BoP. Our findings indicate that the ability of MFIs to provide knowledge support to
encourage entrepreneurship while operating as viable businesses is contingent on context. Our study
paves the way for future research on the importance of contextual factors to understand the challenges
and opportunities presented by the need to encourage entrepreneurship in emerging markets.
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